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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent,* 
* -vs-
ALAN DOUGLAS ASAY, * 
Defendant-Appellant * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CASE NO. 
16973 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by Complaint and information 
with one count of Theft, in violation of Utah Code Annota-
ted, §76-6-404 and §76-6-412 (1) (a) (i) (1953). 
DISPOSITTION OF THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried by a jury before the Honorable 
A.H. Ellett in the Second Judicial District Court for Davis 
County, State of Utah and found guilty of Theft on February 
11, 1980. 
Appellant was setenced for the term provided for 
law, but the sentence was suspended and Defendant allowed 
probation upon payment of a $5,000.00 fine and restitution, 
all to be paid within one year, at which time probation 
would terminate. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks the reversal of the verdict and 
sentence of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the evening of July 10, 1979, Eric Rasmussen 
and his fiance went to a theatre near Trolley Square, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, to attend a movie. The show ended at approx-
imately 10:30 pm and when they returned to the spot where 
they had left their car they discovered it had been stolen. 
(T.31, lines 13-22) 
Mr. Wayne Pascoe resides in Bountiful, Utah, in the 
vicinity of a business establishment which rented storage 
sheds to consumers. Shortly after 11:00 pm on the night of 
July 10, 1979, Mr. Pascoe spotted some suspicious activity 
in his neighborhood. (T.49, lines 24-29) His investigation 
lead him to a nearby storage shed.where, from a distance 
of twenty to thiry feet, he observed two men park what he 
later learned was Mr. Rasmussen's car in the shed. (T.50, 
lines 29-3-, T.51, lines 1-2) 
On the following day, the police were summoned by 
Mr. Pascoe to his residence in response to his report of 
suspicious circumstances in the vicinity of the storage 
shed. (T.35,line 28- T. 26, line 1) The police observed 
the Defendant removing automobile parts from his shed and 
placing them in the back of a pick-up truck. (T.36, lines 
15-18) After questioning the Defendant for a few moments, 
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the police placed him under arrest. (T.37, lines 8-17). 
The automobile was later determined to be Mr. Rasmussen's 
auto. 
At his trial, the Appellant testified as to how he 
came to be in possession of Mr. Rasmussen's vehicle. He 
related that he met two men approximately three weeks prior 
to his arrest who stated that they sometimes worked on auto-
mobiles. (T.68, lines 8-12, lines 21-23) As the Appellant's 
sister had damaged her car and needed some parts (T.68, lines 
26-27), the Appellant gave the two indiviudals his phone num-
ber and asked them to contact him if they ever came across 
the appropriate parts. (T. 69, lines 3-11) They pho.ned him 
on July 10, 1979, and told him they had the parts. (T.69, 
lines 15-20) As the Appellant had a date planned for that 
evening, he arranged to meet them briefly in order to give 
them the key to his storage shed so that they could place 
the parts there for his inspection. (T.69, lines 27-30) At 
no time did the individuals indicate to the Appellant that 
the parts were stolen. (T.69, lines 5-7) 
The Appellant testified that when he visited his 
storage shed the following morning, he was surprised to find 
an entire vehicle in the shed. (T. 70, lines 24-27) He 
returned later in the afternoon to remove parts from the 
auto. (T.71, lines 3-8) Upon examining the vehicle, he 
determined that the parts he needed were in good shape (T.71, 
lines 19-21), but that the ignition was missing and the car 
-3-
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was otherwise inoperable. (T.71, lines 17-23) When the 
police arrived and began to question the Appellant, he be-
came suspicious that the car was stolen. (T. 73, lines 16-20: 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY IN-
STRUCT THE JURY CONCERNING THE ELEMENTS 
OF THE CRIME AND THE DEFENDANT'S DEFENSE 
At the conclusion of the Defendant's trial, defense 
counsel objected to the jury instructions of the Court. 
Specifically, the Defendant objected to Instruction No. 8 
(attached) as given by the Court and the failure to include 
Defendant's proposed Instructions No. 1 and No. 7 (attached). 
Defendant has therefore preserved his right to challenge the 
s ufficiency of the instructions provided by Rule 51 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Defendant's objections, in general terms, center 
around the failure of the trial court to instruct adequately 
concerning the elements of the crime of theft in that neither 
the actus reus nor mens rea were properly defined; and the 
refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury concerning 
the Appellant's theory of defense. 
A. THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE TRIAL 
COURT FAILED TO APPRISE THE JURY OF 
THE NEED TO FIND BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT THAT THE DEFENDANT POSSESSED 
CRIMINAL INTENT AT THE MOMENT HE 
ACQUIRED OR EXERCISED CONTROL OF THE 
PROPERTY OF ANOTHER. 
It is well established that jury instructions must 
instruct the jury on all of the elements of a criminal 
offense, and that the jury must find the Defendant guilty 
-4-
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beyond a reasonable doubt as to each of those elements. It 
is further certain that the criminal intent of the Defendant 
is an element of theft. 
Where there is a question concerning the intent of 
the Defendant, State v Cude (1) requires that an instruction 
present the question to the jury. In that case, the Defen-
dant left his auto to be repaired at a service station. 
When he couldn't pay for the repairs, the station owner 
kept the auto to secure the Mechanic's Lien. The Defendant, 
believing that he had a right to reclaim his vehicle, went 
to the service station during the night and drove it away. 
The majority wrote: 
"It is fundamental that an essential element 
of larceny is the intent to steal the pro-
perty of another. Consequently, if there 
is any reasonable basis in the evidence upon 
which the jury could believe that the accu~ed 
thought he had a right to take possession of 
the automobile, or if the evidence in that 
regard is such that it might raise a reason-
able doubt that he had the intent to steal, 
then that issue should be presented to the 
jury ... 
This proposition is affirmed by the ex-
pression of the courts of numerous jurisdic-
tion [footnote omitted}. In the Oklahoma 
case of Linde v State [footnote omitted], 
the court reversed a conviction for larceny 
upon the ground of the trial court's failure 
to give a requested instruction to the 
effect that: 
'If at the time of the taking of the pro-
perty by the Defendant he in good faith be-
lieved said property was his or they had reason-
able doubt to that effect, they should acquit 
him. This although he may have been mistaken 
in such belief.' " (2) 
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The Defendant's testimony that he believed that he 
was lawfully purchasing auto parts from two acquaintances 
provides a "reasonable basis upon which the jury could be-
lieve that the accused thought he had a right to take posses-
sion" of the property. Therefore, State v Cude requires that 
the trial court have instructed the jury regarding the issue 
of the Defendant's intent. Further, the failure to instruct 
upon an essential element of the crime charged is reversible 
error. (3) 
Looking at the instructions given by the trial court 
in their entirety, there are two possible instructions which 
might be argued as addressing the issue of intent. The 
first of these is Instruction No. 8, which reads in part: 
"Before you can convict the Defendant of 
the crime of Theft, you must find from 
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
all of the following elements of the 
crime: 4. [That the Defendant] did com-
mit the offense of theft, in that he did 
obtain or exercise unauthorized control 
over the property of another, to-wit, an 
automobile in operable condition, with 
the purposed to deprive the owner thereof ... " 
The phrase "he did obtain or exercise unauthorized 
control over the property of another" fails to address the 
issue of intent, as it merely specifies the forbidden con-
duct. The phrase contains no warning to the jury that they 
must find that the Defendant obtained or exercised control 
over property knowing that he was unauthorized to obtain or 
exercise such control. 
The final clause of the quoted language, "with the 
-6-
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purpose to deprive the owner thereof", also does not inform 
the jury that they must find that the Defendant had criminal 
intent. The term ''purpose to deprive" is clearly defined at 
76-6-401 (3): 
" 'Purpose to deprive' means to have the con-
scious object: 
(a) To withhold permanently or for so ex-
tended period or to use under such 
circumstances that a substantial por-
tion of its economic value, or the use 
and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon pay-
ment of a reward or other compensation; 
or 
(c) To dispose of the property under circum-
stances that make it unlikely that the 
owner will recover it." 
Under its statutory definition, therefore, the phrase 
"with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof" does not re-
late to intent at all, but rather to the definition of a 
taking as an element of theft. For example, a person pur-
chasing merchandise in a store has the purpose to deprive the 
owner of the property under the definition state at 76-6-401 (3), 
but still lacks the criminal intent. Nothing in the statu-
tory definition of "purpose to deprive" requires that the per-
son know that he has no right to withhold the property from 
the owner, or know that his taking the property is wrongful. 
One might argue that the phrase "purpose to deprive 
the owner thereof" was not used in a technical sense, but 
rather was used as customary, everyday language. As the 
Judge was instructing the jury on the elements of the crime 
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of theft, and the "purpose to deprive the owner thereof" is 
an element of theft (4), the more logical view is that the 
Judge did intend the phrase to have its statutory meaning. 
The second instruction which arguably pertained to 
criminal intent is Instruction No. 13 (attached). The por-
tion of this instruction which relates to mes rea reads as 
follows: 
"In the crime charged in the Information, 
there must exist a union or joint opera-
tion of act or conduct and criminal intent. 
To constitute criminal intent, it is not 
necessary that there should exist an intent 
to violate the law. Where a person inten-
tionally does that which the law declares 
to be a crime, he is acting with criminal 
intent, even though he may not know that 
his act or conduct is unlawful_." 
Two faults lie with this instruction. First, while 
the Court clearly informed the jury in Instruction No. 8 
that the State had to prove each of the elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, Instruction No. 13 contains 
no similar statement placing the burden of showing intent 
upon the State. Nor does the instruction make clear that 
the criminal intent must exist at the time of the taking. 
Instruction No. 13, therefore, fails to adequately instruct 
the jury that criminal intent is an element of the crime of 
theft which must be proved by the prosecution beyond a rea-
s onab lre doubt . 
Instruction No. 13 is identical in all material re-
spects with an instruction ratified in State v Smith.(5) 
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The second problem with Instruction No. 13 is that it was 
extracted from State v Smith out of context from the facts 
of that case. In State v Smith, the Defendant delivered a 
check in exchange for a deed to real property knowing that 
he had insufficient funds in his checking account to cover 
the check. His defense was that he claimed to have told the 
payees that the check would not be honored by the drawee but 
that he would call them when he deposited the necessary funds. 
The question presented was whether he could be convicted even 
though he did not realize the criminality of his conduct in 
issuing a check in excess of his funds, since he intended to 
ultimately honor the check. The Utah Supreme Court approved 
the language of the instruction given to the jury at Defen-
dant Smith's trial, but Justice Wilkins explained their appro-
val by writing, "The trial court's instruction is a statement 
of 'ignorance of the law is no defense', and is an accurate 
statement of the law applicable to the criminal charges in 
the instant case." (6) 
It is therefore clear that the instruction approved 
in State v Smith is proper where the issue raised is the de-
fense of mistake of law. But that is not the issue in the 
present case. The Appellant's defense is that he made a 
mistake in fact, in that he believed that he was authorized 
to remove the parts from the automobile. Instruction No. 13 
could only have lead the jury to conclude that the Defendant 
was guilty of theft, if the State proved that he obtained 
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or exercise unauthorized control over the property of anotheri 
even if the jury found that he honestly believed he had a 
right to the property. As applied to the facts of this case, 
Instruction No. 13 has created a kind of strict liability 
theft offense, dispensing with the mens rea requirement en-
tirely~ Such a result is contrary to both Utah caselaw and 
Utah statutes. 
Both Instruction No. 8 and Instruction No. 13 fall 
short of properly defining for the jury the criminal intent 
element of the offense of theft. Taken as a whole, the trial 
court's instructions fail to turn the jury's attention to the 
question of whether the Defendant possessed criminal intent 
at the time he exercised unauthorized control over the pro-
perty of another. 
Either Defendant's Proposed Instruction No. 1 or No. 
7 (attached) would have remedied the omission of a mens rea 
instruction by the trial court. Defendant's Proposed Instruc-
tion No. 1 simply recites the defenses to a theft prosecution 
found at §76-6-402, U.C.A. 1953. These defenses each involve 
the Defendant's assertion that he had a right to the property 
which was the object of the alleged theft, and thus relate to 
the criminal intent of the accused. Defendant's Proposed In-
struction No. 7 more directly confronts the question of in-
tent by specifically stating that a felonious intent must 
exist at the time of the taking. 
The error of the trial court in failing to properly 
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instruct regarding the element of intent is not simply harm-
~ss error. There was never any doubt that it was the Defen-
dant who was arrested while removing parts from an automobile 
which he later learned was stolen; the only question was 
whether he honestly believed that he had a right to remove 
1he parts. By improperly instructing the jury on the element 
of criminal intent, the trial court effectively removed the 
t 
only genuine issue from in front of the jury and precluded 
the Appellant from receiving a fair trial. His conviction 
must therefore be reversed. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY ON THE APPELLANT'S THEORY OF DEFENSE 
In Defendant's Proposed Instruction No. 1 (attached), 
the Defendant requested the trial court to instruct the jury 
regarding his theory of defense. The requested instruction 
would have instructed the jury that it was a defense to the 
information if the Defendant acted under an honest claim of 
right to the property or an honest belief that he had a 
right to exercise control over the property, or if he hon-
estly believed that the owner would have consented to his 
exercise of control if he had been present. This instruc-
tion is certainly an accurate statement of the law, as it 
is taken almost verbatim from §76-6-402 U.C.A. 1953, which 
lists defenses to the charge of theft. 
Defendant's Proposed Instruction No. 1 was denied 
by the trial court, and no substitute instruction on the 
Defendant's theory was give to the jury. 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah caselaw clearly conunands a trial court to in-
struct the jury on the theories of both the Defendant and 
the prosecution, and the failure to do so is reversible 
error. (7) However, before a Defendant is entitled to an 
instruction on his defense, there must be sufficient evidence 
before the jury to justify the instruction. This evidentiary 
burden can be conveniently divided into two components: the 
focus of evidence required and the quantity of evidence re-
quired. 
The question of the focus of the required evidence 
was addressed in State v Johnson. (8) That case involved an 
accused charged with involun_tary manslaughter who argued that 
the circumstances surrounding the killing entitled him to an 
instruction of the defense of self-defense. The majority wrote 
"It is admitted that the Def~eridartt is entitled 
to have the jury instructed on his theory of 
the case if there is any substantial evidence 
to justify giving such an instruction. How-
ever, when the legislature permits a Defen-
dant to avoid the consequences of his act 
because the killing was excusable, an in-
struction is not necessary unless the facts 
and circumstances impelling the accused to 
act are in some way consistent with the leg-
islative intent to excuse." (9) 
The Court then examined several cases dealing with self-defense 
instructions and continued: 
"It will be noted from the resume of the 
evidence as given that in most of the 
quoted cases, the evidence of the Defen-
dant established a state of facts which, 
if believed by the jury, established 
adequate provocation, lawful acts on the 
part of the Defendant, or other aggravat-
ing facts not present in the case at bar. 
-12-
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Had the Defendant's evidence in this case 
presented an issue of fact under any one 
of the provisions of our excusable homi-
cide statute, then he, too, would have been 
entitled to an instruction on one part or 
all parts of the section." (10) 
State v Johnson speaks to the focus of the evidence 
which must be presented to entitle an accused to an instruc-
tion of his defense. The evidence which he offers must be 
consistent with the defense provided by the Legislature and 
relate to the provisions of the legislative defense. As 
applied to the offense of theft, State v Johnson indicates 
that the evidence of the accused must be consistent with the 
rationale behind the legislative defense and relevant to 
the specific provisions of §76-6-402, U.C.A. 1953. 
The quantity of the evidence which must be offered 
by a Defendant to entitle him to an instruction on his theory 
of a defense is a different question. State v Johnson refers 
to substantial evidence as the requisite quantum of proof, 
but this issue was not adequately addressed until State v 
Castillo. (11) Once again the Utah Supreme Court was con-
fronted by a Defendant's claim that he killed another while 
acting in self defense, and the Court wrote: 
"Both the State and Defendant agree that 
a Defendant is entitled to have a jury 
instructed on his theory of the case, if 
there by any substantial evidence to jus-
tify giving such an instruction ... 
If the Defendant's evidence, although in 
material conflict with the State's proof ,be 
such that the jury may entertain a reasonable 
doubt as to whether or not he acted in self-
-13-
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defense, he is entitled to have the 
jury instructed fully and clearly on 
the law of self-defense. Conversely, 
if all reasonable men must conclude 
that the evidence is so slight as to 
be incapable of raising a reasonable 
doubt in the jury's mind as to whether 
a Defendant accused of a crime acted 
in self-defense, tendered instructions 
thereon are properly refused." (12) 
In general terms, therefore, State v Castillo held 
that a Defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory · 
of defense unless as a matter of law, he has offered so little 
and such poor evidence that no jury could possibly believe 
his story. The Court is essentially stating that the Defen-
dant is entitled to an instruction on his defense unless his 
evidence fails to present a question of fact for the jury to 
decide, similar to where a directed verdict is appropriate in 
a civil suit. This standard must be construed most favor-
ably to t_he Defendant, as any other reading of State v Castill 
would endanger the Defendant's right to a jury trial under 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The evidence presented at trial by the Appellant in 
this case easily meets the evidentiary standards declared in 
State v Johnson and State v Castillo. The Defendant was 
charged with the theft of the vehicle. In his defense, he 
testified that he had met two young men three weeks previous 
to his arrest, given them his phone number, and told them to 
phone him if they ever came across parts which were compatible 
with his sister's damaged car. (T.68, lines 4-15, T.69, 
lines 3-11) On the night that he received the call, he had 
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a date with his girlfriend planned, so he met with them only 
briefly. He gave them the key to his storage shed and in-
structed them to leave off the parts for his inspection the 
following day. (T.69, lines 27-30) 
To an extent, this story was corroborated by Mr. 
Wayne Pascoe, a witness for the State. Mr. Pascoe testi-
fied that he saw two men the night the theft occurred, park-
ing the car in Mr. Asay's storage shed, and that the was with-
in: thirty feet of them during this process; yet he could never 
idenfity the Appellant as either of the two men. (T.50, 
line 29-30, T.51, lines 1-2, T.59, lines 8-19). Even though 
it was dark, the failure of Mr. Pascoe to idenfity the Defen-
dant supports the Defendant's story that he was buying parts 
from two men. 
This evidence satisfies State v Johnson (13) insofar 
as the evidence pertains to the statutory defenses to the 
crime of theft found at §76-6-402, U.C.A. 1953. This statute 
creates a defense where the accused acted under an honest 
claim of right to the property or under an honest claim that 
he had the right to exercise control over the property, or 
where the Defendant honestly believed that the owner of the 
property would have consented to his control if the owner 
of the property would have consented to his control if the 
owner were present. The Defendant's testimony seeks to 
establish that he honestly believed that he was purchasing 
auto parts from persons he believed owned the auto. This 
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evidence is directly relevant to any of the three statutory 
defenses, and therefore State v Johnson provides that an 
instruction on the Appellant's defense was required. 
The requirements of State v Castillo (14) are also 
met by the Defendant's testimony. No direct evidence was 
offered by the State to connect the Defendant to the actual 
theft of the car and no testimony of any kind was presented 
to rebut the Appellant's version of the incident. On the 
other hand, the testimony of the Defendant, corroborated 
to an extent by Mr. Pascoe, was easily sufficient to raise 
a reasonable doubt as to whether the Appellant had an honest 
belief that he was entitled to take parts from the auto. 
For the trial Judge to decide as a matter of law that the 
Appellant's testimony was insufficient to raise a reasonable 
doubt as to the guilt of the Defendant was a flagrant usurpa-
tion of the role of the jury. An instruction regarding the 
statutory defenses to the crime of theft was required. 
The failure to give such an instruction was not harm-
less error. Coupled with the inadequacy of the instructions 
relating to intent, the instructions as a whole failed to 
present the Appellant's defense before the jury. If proper 
instructions had been tendered to the jury, an entirely 
different verdict may have been reached; the failure to 
adequately instruct the jury on the Appellant's defense was 
fundamentally unfair and deprived the Appellant of a fair 
trial. His conviction must therefore be reversed. 
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C. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY 
INSTRUCT THE JURY CONCERNING THE 
PRESUMPTION THAT ONE IN RECENT 
POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY WHO 
CANNOT SATISFACTORILY EXPLAIN HIS 
POSSESSION STOLE THE PROPERTY. 
The Appellant in this case was charged with the theft 
of an automobile owned by another. At the trial, the State 
offered no direct proof connecting the Appellant with the 
theft of the car, but relied exclusively upon the statutory 
presumption found at §76-6-402, U.C.A. 1953: 
"Possession of property recently stolen, 
no satisfactory explanation of such 
possession is made, shall be deemed 
prima facie evidence that the person in 
possession stole the property." 
This presumption may be utilized in two ways. The 
primary effect of the statute allows the trial Judge to de-
termine whether the accused is in possession of recently 
stolen property, and whether he has offered a satisfactory 
explanation of his possession. If the Judge finds the ex~ 
planation unsatisfactory, he may hold that a prima facie 
case has been made out by the State and, even in the absence 
of any other evidence, deny a motion to dismiss made by the 
Defendant at the conclusion of the State's case. (15) More 
importantly in the context of this appeal, the presumption 
may also be placed in front of the jury for their consider-
ation in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. 
The statutory presumption was presented to the jury 
as part of Instruction No. 8: "You are further instructed 
that one who is found to be in possession of property re-
cently stolen, may be found to be the guilty person unless 
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he gives a satisfactory explanation of his possession there-
of." This instruction is not proper because it fails to 
place the burden on the State to prove the Defendant's ex -
planation of his possession unsatisfactory, and instead re-
quires the Defendant to prove his explanation satisfactory. 
The use of presumptions in criminal cases has come 
under frequent attach through the years as contrary to Due 
Process of Law and the legal maxim of innocent until proven 
guilty. However, the use of presumptions has just as fre-
quently been upheld as court have repeatedly emphasized that 
the burden of proof does not shift to the Defendant to rebut 
the presumption. 
The decisions of the Utah Supreme Court are no ex-
ception to the general rule. In State v Wood (16), the 
Court wrote: 
"The contention that this portion of the 
statute forces upon the Defendant the 
burden of proving his innocence has been 
rejected by this court in many instances. 
The State must prove not only the larceny 
and recent possession but also that [the 
Defendant] failed to make a satisfactory 
explanation of his possession." (17) 
And in State v Little (18), the majority held, "The burden 
of proving guilt remains at all times with the State and the 
State must prove not only the larceny and recent possession 
but also that Defendant failed to make a satisfactory explan-
ation of his possession." (19) 
The operation of the presumption statute was most 
clearly and most recently described in State v Jolley (20): 
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"Th 1 e statute correct y read, however, states 
that mere possession is sufficient to esta-
blish a prima f acie case of theft unless the 
possession of the stolen property is satis-
factorily explained. This requires that the 
Defendant must offer his explanation as to 
how he came into possession of a stolen pro-
prety; and upon that offer, the State has 
the burden of proving that the explanation 
was an unsatisfactory one." (21) 
While the three cited cases above each hold that the 
burden of proving the accused's explanation unsatisfactory 
is on the State, Instruction No. 8 serves to instruct the 
jury that a person in possession of recently stolen property 
may be found guilty "unless he gives a satisfactory explan-
ation of his possession thereof." This shifting of the bur-
den is contrary Utah caselaw. 
Only two Utah cases discuss the sufficiency of in-
struction dealing with the presumption arising out of pos-
session of recently stolen property. In State v Hall (22), 
the Defendant challenged an instruction given by the trial 
court which stated that possession of recently stolen pro-
~rty without a satisfactory explanation constituted a prima 
facie case, but that the State must still prove the guilt 
of ·the Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court 
held the instruction improper but not prejudicial, since the 
erroneous instruction was coupled with an admonition to the 
jury to require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The majority wrote: 
" ... it would have been more proper to instruct 
the jury in substance that if found from 
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the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt 
that someone had connnited the larceny as 
charged, that the Defendant was found in 
possession of the recently stolen goods 
and that it further found that he failed 
to give a satisfactory explanation, there 
would arise an inference that the Defendant 
committed the larceny and that this infer-
ence might, with all other circumstances, 
be considered in determining whether or not 
the jury was convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt of the Defendant's guilt." (23) 
The second Utah Supreme Court case deciding the 
sufficiency of instructions describing the statutory pre-
sumption is State v Pappacostas (24). In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Crockett wrote: 
" ... I think that under some circumstances 
it may be both advisable and correct for 
the trial court to instruct the jury in 
simple and concise language on the sub-
ject dealt with in that statute. 
The determination of the facts should 
be surupulously left to the jury. They 
could be told that if they believe from 
the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the property had been recently stolen; that 
it was found in the possession of the Defen-
dant; and that when afforded an opportunity, 
he gave no satisfactory explanation of his 
possession, then if it so appeals to their 
minds they may draw an inference that the 
Defendant committed the larceny, which in-
ference might be considered by them along 
with all the evidence in the case in deter-
mining whether they were convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt of the Defendant's guilt." (25) 
The portion of Instruction No. 8 relative to the 
statutory presumption, given to the jury at the Appellant's 
trial, fails to require the jury to find that the State 
l"a.s proven the explanation of the Defendant unsatisfactory 
beyond a reasonable doubt. To the contrary~ by ~ts @wn 
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language instruction permits the jury to find a Defendant in 
possession of recently stolen property guilty of theft unless 
the Defendant provides a satisfactory explanation. This lan-
guage places both the burden of production and the burden of 
persuasion on the Defendant to prove that his explanation is 
satisfactory·, in conflict with State v Wood (26), State v 
Little (27), and State v Jolley, (28). 
The State may argue that the concluding language of 
Instruction No. 8 requiring the jury to insist upon proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt as to each element of the offense 
serves to render any error in the presumption instruction harm-
less as in State v Hall. However, this concluding language 
operates to worsen the prejudicial effect of the erroneous 
instruction on the presumption, as this concluding language 
only requires the State to prove each element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt while listing the elements of the 
offense in paragraphs one through five Instruction No. 8. 
Thus, by an implication which arises from omitting proof of an 
tmsatisfactory explanation from the list of elements of the 
offense, Instruction No. 8 actually furthers the impression 
that the burden is on the Defendant to prove his explanation 
satisfactory. An instruction more clearly contrary to State v 
Hall (29) and State vs Pappacostas (30) would be difficult to 
fashion. A more correct statement of the law can be found in 
Defendant's Proposed Instruction No. ~· 
When used properly, presumptions in criminal trials 
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serve a useful purpose by shifting the burden of producing 
evidence on an issue to the party with the most ready access to 
that information. However, this tool is not without its dan-
gers, and principal among these dangers is that the ultimate 
burden of persuasion can be mistakenly shifted to the Defendant. 
Such a result is diametrically opposed to the fundamental pre-
cept of Anglo-American jurisprudence that an accused is inno-
cent until proven guilty. With this in mind, the Appellant 
urges the Court to review the instruction on the presumption 
with special care and attention; and should the Court con-
elude, as the Appellant contends, that the instruction fails to 
forcefully place the burden of proof on the State-as to the 
sufficiency of the Defendant's explanation, the conviction of 
the Defendant must be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE 
WHICH WAS EITHER HEARSAY OR IMMATERIAL. 
During direct examination of Detective Phil Leonard 
by the prosecutor, the witness testified that the Defendant 
told him at the time of his arrest that the Defendant knew the 
automobile was stolen. (T.42, lines 9-11) This statement was 
in sharp conflict with the story related by Detective Leonard 
to William Carlson, a private investigator employed by defense 
counsel, who interviewed Detective Leonard several days before 
trial. In order to impeach the testimony of Detective Leonard, 
defense counsel placed William Carlson on the stand to testify 
to the prior inconsistent statement made by Detective Leonard. 
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The exchange of which the Appellant complains took 
place during the cross-examination of Mr. Carlson by the pro-
secutor. (Tr. 86-90) The prosecutor asked Mr. Carlson whether 
he had had a copy of a police report written by a second of fi-
cer at the time he had interviewed Dectective Leonard. When 
Mr. Carlson answered in the affirmative and a copy of the re-
port was furnished, the prosecutor continued his questioning by 
inquiring whether the report contained a statement that indi-
cated that Mr. Asay had told Detective Leonard that he knew 
the vehicle was stolen. 
At that point, defense counsel objected to the ques-
tioning as eliciting a response which would constitute hear-
say. The following exchange then took place: (Tr.88, lines 19-28) 
THE COURT: He is not trying to prove that the state-
ment is true or untrue, he is simply ask-
ing the question as to whether or not 
this matter was brought to the officer's 
attention when the officer testified as 
he said he testified. 
MR. PHIL HANSEN: If in fact he is not offereing to 
prove the proof [sic] of the mat-
ter, then it's irmnaterial. 
THE COURT: Objection is overruled, you may proceed 
counsel. 
MR. PHIL HANSEN: And may I inquire him [the prosecutor] 
if he is offering it to prove the 
truth of that statement? 
THE COURT: No, go ahead counsel, ask your next question. 
The State then offered the police report into evidence, de-
fense counsel objected to the lack of foundation for the evi-
dence, and the court overruled the objection stating, "The 
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purpose of receiving it is solely for the purpose of letting 
the jury know what was before the two parties at the time the 
conversation occurred." (TR.89, lines 7-9) The portion of 
the police report relating that Detective Leonard told the 
author of the report that the Defendant had told Detective 
Leonard that the Defendant knew the car was stolen was there-
after admitted. 
Defense counsel have properly objected to the admission 
of the portion of the police report as being either hearsay or 
immaterial. The definition of hearsay is found in Rule 63 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: "Evidence of a statement 
which is made other than by a witness while testifying at the 
hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter is hearsay 
evidence and inadmissible except ... " . But the portion of the 
report admitted is actually hearsay within hearsay within hear-
say, as it consists of a statement allegedly made by the Defen-
dant to Detective Leonard, who in turn related the statement 
to a second officer who wrote the report. 
However, the trial court ruled that the statement in 
the police report, that the Defendant told Detective Leonard 
that he knew the car was stolen, was not hearsay, since it was 
not offered to prove the truth of the statement. While the pro· 
secutor never explained for himself why he was seeking the ad-
admnission of the portion of the police report, he must be 
bound by the explanation provided by the Court that the report 
was not offered for its truth, since the Court's explanation 
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was offered in his presence and his response was silence. 
Given that the statement in the police report was not 
offered for its truth, the question remains whether the state-
ment was offered for a valid purpose or whether it was imma-
terial as contended by the Appellant. Once again, the prose-
cution's silence must be viewed as· assent to the statement of 
the Court that the purpose of receiving the evidence was to 
let the jury know what was before Mr. Ca~lson when he inter-
viewed Detective Leonard. 
What was before 'Mr. Carlson at the time he intel:;'viewed 
Detective Leonard is not material to the issue of the Def en-
dant' s guilt, certainly. Perhaps the only possibility is that 
the information is 1:1elevant to the i.mpeachment of Mr. Carlson's 
testimony, but it :ts· difficult even on this basis to see the 
connect~on between the contents of a pelice report and Mr. 
Carlson's statement of hi.s conversation with Detective Leonard. 
The contents of a police report~ even though it was available 
to Mr. Carlson at the time he talked with Detective Leonard, 
ha$ no conc·ei_vable relation to whether Mr. Carlson truthfully 
related his conversation with Detecti'V'e Leonard. 
Fi.nally, the police report was not admissible to reha-
bilitate Detective Leonard through a priol:" cons·istent state-
ment because of the hearsay problem. The report asserted that 
Detective Leonard made a statement to the author· of the report, 
but the admission of a written report to prove that Detective 
Leonard made the statement would be hearsay. 
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Consequently, the admission of the portion of the 
police report, relating that Detective Leonard said that the 
Defendant told Detective Leonard that the Defendant knew the 
car was stolen, was error. Although Detective Leonard had 
already testified to this orally, the improper admission of 
the contents of the report was not harmless in that such 
statements have a cumulative effect and also the jury might 
easily be unduly influenced from the fact that the statement 
was found in a police report, rather than made from memory. 
The conviction of the Defendant must therefore be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE 
GUILT OF THE DEFENDANT BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT. 
The Appellant contends that the evidence presented by 
the State is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. In order to determine the sufficiency of the evi-
dence three matters must be determined: the offense with 
which the Defendant was charged, the evidence which is re-
quired to convict him, and the evidence presented against the 
Appellant. 
The Defendant was charged with theft, in that he alleg-
edly obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the pro-
perty of another. It was further alleged that the property 
stolen by him was an operable motor vehicle. 
The evidence required to convict a Defendant, in gen-
eral terms, was defined in State v Romero (31): 
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" ... the evidence required need be only that 
which is sufficient to conform to the 
statutory definition of the crime charged 
and the 'element of offense' is defined a~ 
(a) conduct, attendant circumstances, or 
results of conduct; and (b) the requisite 
mental state." (32) 
More specifically, "The only elements needed to be proved 
under the statute are (1) the intent to deprive another of 
his property, and (2) the obtaining unauthorized control 
over the property." (33) When the State intends to rely, 
as in the instant case, on the statutory presumption that 
one in recent possession of stolen property has stolen the 
property unless a satisfactory explanation is give there-
fore, the prosecution is also required to prove the explana-
tion of the Defendant unsatisfactory. (34) 
The question of whether a conviction may rest entirely 
upon the failure of a Defendant to a satisfactorily explain 
his possession of recently stolen property has been decided 
by the Utah Supreme Court on two occasions. In the earlier 
of the two cases, State v Dyett (35), the majority wrote: 
"Under Sec. 10303601, U.C.A. 1943 an accused 
may be convicted of larceny without direct 
proof identifying him as the thief, if he 
is found in possession of recently stolen 
property and fails to give a satisfactory 
explanation of how he acquired such posses-
sion. Many convictions of the crime of 
larceny have been affirmed in this Court 
when there has not been any evidence con-
necting the Defendant with the theft apart 
from his possession of the stolen goods." (36) 
However, the resolution of this question pronounced in State 
v Dyett was reversed by implication in 1972 in State v Heath 
(37): 
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"The mere possession of stolen property un.-
explained by the person in charge thereof 
is not in and of itself sufficient to jus-
tify a conviction of larceny of the pro-
perty. It is however, a circumstance to 
be considered in connection with the other 
evidence in the case in the determination 
of the guilt or innocence of the possessor. 
Such possession is a circumstance tending 
in some degree to show guilt, although it 
is not sufficient, standing alone and un-
supported by other evidence, to warrant a 
conviction. In addition to the proof of 
the larceny and of the possession by the 
Defendant, there must be proof of corrob-
orating circumstances tending of themselves 
to show guilt." (38) 
The standard applied to evaluate the sufficiency of 
the evidence was most recently pronounced in State v Daniels 
(39): 
"For the Defendant to successfully challenge 
the sufficiency of the evidence underlying 
his conviction, he must show, 'when view-
ing the evidence and all inference that may 
reasonably be drawn therefrom, iri the light 
most favorable to the verdict of the jury, 
reasonable minds could not believe him 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt'. State v 
Mills, Utah 530 P.2dl272 (1975)." (40) 
However, where the prosecution relies on circumstantial evi~ 
dence, State v Romero (44) places a heavier burden on the 
State: 
"When the only proof of presumed facts con-
s is ts of circumstantial evidence, the cir-
cumstances must reasonably preclude every 
reasonable hypothesis of Defendant's inno-
cence, but this is not controlling when 
only part of the evidence is circumstantial.: (42) 
The evidence presented by the State fails to meet the 
tests of State v Daniels and State v Romero. While the 
Defendant is charged with the theft of an operable motor 
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vehicle, the last moment at which the State proved that the 
auto was operable was approximately 11:30 pm on the night of 
July 10, 1979. This was established by Mr. Pascoe, who test-
ified that he saw the auto being driven into a storage shed 
at that time; (t.50, lines 16-22) however, he was unable to 
identify the Defendant as one of the two men he viewed on 
that occasion from just thirty feet. (t.50, lines 29-30, T.51, 
lines 1-2, T.59, lines 8-19) In addition, when the Defendant 
was arrested on the following afternoon dismantling the auto 
the ignition switch was not in the vehicle and was not found 
in the possession of the Defendant. There is no evidence, 
circumstantial or direct, connecting the Defendant to an 
operable motor vehicle. 
The only evidence connecting the Defendant to the 
theft is the presumption arising from his possession of 
recently stolen property. Under State v Heath, this is in-
sufficient by itself to support a conviction, but rather the 
presumption requires some corroborating evidence. This the 
State did not provide. Should the State argue that the Defen-
dant's actions and statements at the time of his arrest tended 
to show his guilt, this too, would be only circumstancial evi-
dence of guilt, and under State v Romero the prosecution would 
be required to show that the circumstances precluded every 
reasonable hypothesis of the Defendant's guilt. But here 
again, it is important to recall that the Defendant is charged 
with the theft of an operable motor vehicle and not mere 
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possession of stolen property, and while the Defendant's 
conduct at the time of his arrest may be argued to imply 
guilt of some crime, his conduct does not show that the Defen-
dant has committed a theft of an operable motor vehicle. 
In conclusion, the evidence presented by the State 
is not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the Defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized control over 
an operable automobile. The prosecution's evidence consists 
merely of the statutory presumption, uncorroborated by other 
evidence connecting the Defendant to the theft, and this is 
insufficient as a matter of law to convict the Defendant. 
Therefore, the conviction must be reversed. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
Before you can convict the Defendant of the crime of 
Theft, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
all of the following elements of the crime: 
1. That the Defendant, Alan Douglas Asay, 
2. On or about the 11th day of July, 1979, 
3. At Bountiful, County of Davis, State of Utah, 
4. Did commit the offense of theft, in that he did 
obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the 
property of another, to-wit, an automobile in oper-
able condition, with the purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof. 
5. Contrary to the Statutes of the State of Utah. 
You are instructed that a person is guilty of theft if he 
participates in planning a theft or in concealing the theft from 
the owner or the law officers and it is not required that he act 
alone in the matter. However, in order to be guilty of the offense, 
~ must be involved in the commission of the crime. 
You are further instructed that one who is found to be in 
possession of property recently stolen, may be found to be the 
gui~ty person unless he gives a satisfactory explanation of his 
possession thereof. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all 
of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it is your duty to convict the Defendant. On the other 
hand if the evidence has failed to so establish one or more of 
' 
said elements then you should find the Defendant no guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
In the crime charged in the Information, there 
must exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct 
and criminal intent. To const~tute criminal intent, it 
is· not neces·sary that there should exist an intent to vio-
late th.e law. Where a person intentionally does that which 
the law delcares t~ oe a crime, he i.s acting with criminal 
intent, even though h.e may net know that his act Ol" con-
duct is unlawful. 
The intent with which an act is· done is shown by 
the circumstances attending the act, the manner in which 
it is done, the means used, and the soundness af mind and 
disc;retion of the person committing the act. 
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DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED 
INSTRUCTION NO, 1 
You are instructed that it is a defense to a charge 
of theft by receiving and/or theft that the Defendant: (a) 
acted under an honest claim of right to the property or ser-
vice involved; or (b) acted in the honest belief that he had 
the right to obtain or exercise control over the property 
or service as he did, or (c) obtained or exercised control 
over the property or service honestly believing that the 
owner, if present, would have consented. 
That is to say, if you believe that the Defendant 
has show the existence of any of the foregoing defenses, 
you must acquit the Defendant of the charge of theft by 
receiving or of the charge of theft by deception or both. 
You are instructed that the burden is not upon the 
Defendant to prove such a defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It is sufficient if the Defendant proves any one of the 
above enumerated defenses by a preponderance of the evidence. 
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DEFENDANT~· S P'.R,Q]?e)SED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
You are instructed that the required felonious in~ 
tent must exist at th.e time of the taking. 
Th.e mere taking of pers·onal ty of another does not 
constitute theft unless· the taking was wi.th felonious intent;:. 
"',. 
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